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Abstract
I study the robustness of Rubinstein’s (1989) E-Mail Game results
by varying the information that players can utilize. The article follows
one of Morris’ (2002) reactions to the E-Mail game “that one should
try to come up with a model of boundedly rational behavior that
delivers predictions that are insensitive to whether there is common
knowledge or a large number of levels of knowledge”. Players in my
model are presumed to use ‘rough inductive reasoning’ because they
cannot utilize exact information.
The information structure in the E-Mail game is generalized and
the conditions are characterized under which Rubinstein’s results hold.
I find that rough inductive reasoning generates a payoff dominant
equilibrium where the expected payoffs change continuously (instead
of discretely) in the probability of “faulty” communication.
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1 Introduction
Inductive reasoning by economic agents is of great importance to many re-
sults in theoretical economics and game theory. Perfect induction by an
unboundedly rational actor has been found to have both theoretically and
empirically implausible characteristics. The search for reasonable bounded
rationality versions of induction reflects this. In this article I present a model
of rough inductive reasoning, which essentially models a (fully) rational rea-
soning process when players cannot or do not utilize exact information. Play-
ers may use rough induction because the environment does not provide finer
information or because they process the provided information incorrectly.
The context of this paper is given by Rubinstein’s (1989) Electronic Mail
Game which ‘famously’ showed a difference between common knowledge and
“almost common knowledge”. In his model, knowing for certain that commu-
nication happened versus allowing with an arbitrarily small chance that com-
munication has not happened (‘lost messages’) radically changed the equilib-
rium payoffs: under almost common knowledge, players’ strategies suddenly
become indendent of the E-Mail communication whereas they depended on
communication with common knowledge. I generalize the underlying infor-
mation structure of the E-Mail Game, specify the conditions needed to reach
Rubinstein’s result and propose rough inductive reasoning to solve the para-
dox.
Morris (2002) argues that Rubinstein’s results leads to two competing
intuitions how to solve the paradox. Morris (2001+2002) and others1 pro-
pose the notion of approximate common knowledge (ACK). They look for
definitions of ACK which imply that rational behavior under ACK is close
to rational behavior when there is common knowledge. In this article I argue
instead that situations of common knowledge and high numbers of levels of
knowledge are very close in the mind of players. Thus I come up with a spe-
cific form of bounded rational behavior, which can also be interpreted as a
form of limited information technology.2 Under this modification predictions
1Monderer and Samet (1989), Kajii and Morris (1998) and Morris and Shin (1997).
2I study situations where players have different information structures compared to the
original game. For one, players can wrongly process the exact information available to
them, such that they merge different information sets to one. Also, the technology used
to obtain information may differ between players and may itself be flawed, as when they
both read different newspapers that are both imperfect. These technology may coarsen
the information structures of players such that several states of the world end up in one
2
are insensitive to whether there is common knowledge or a large number of
levels of knowledge.
Obviously, the Electronic Mail game is not a particularly realistic model
of real world communication nor is the information structure studied espe-
cially intuitive. Nevertheless, economic agents still ‘try their best’ and it is
hence important to find a reasonable rule for how real life inductive reasoning
occurs.
Experimental data has indeed shown that agents do not use induction
correctly.3 Agents are especially bad at making distinctions between ‘very
large numbers of iterations’ and ‘infinite iterations’, which has lead infinitely
repeated games to yield virtually the same experimental results as finitely
repeated games, though they often should exhibit very different equilibria un-
der subgame perfect backward induction. Deviations from perfect induction
may arise due to the fact that players face limitations on processing infor-
mation. To model this situation I propose variations of the E-Mail game
where the information sets are enlarged in the sense that the possibility of
being unable to distinguish between a range of (large) numbers is introduced.
This enlargement may be due to restrictions of the ability to process infor-
mation or because the information provided is “rougher”, i.e. less detailed
than usually assumed. In the context of the E-Mail game, I give two explicit
interpretations of rough inductive reasoning. In these two variants the in-
formation structure and the belief structure changes such that an additional
payoff-dominant equilibrium exists. In the equilibria of these games players
condition on the E-Mail communication and the expected payoffs to players
changes continuously in the probability that a message gets lost.
Apart from the E-Mail game, there are more sequential games in which
overlapping information sets lead to ‘paradoxes’. Notably, the absentminded
driver (Piccione and Rubinstein (1997))4 and the absentminded centipede
(Dulleck and Oechssler (1997)) also rest on the structure of the information
sets of a decision maker.
information set.
3McKelvey and Palfrey (1992) and Rosenthal (1981) among others present experiments
on the centipede game that support this hypothesis. In the literature one finds also
competing hypotheses - for example altruistic behavior by subjects - which are supported
too. Colin Camerer (2003, chapter 5.3) ran experiments on the E-Mail game. Cabrales,
Nagel and Armenter (2001) study a related “global” game.
4see also Aumann et al. (1997) and the other articles in the special issue of Games and
Economic Behavior on the problem of imperfect recall.
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Dulleck and Oechssler’s (1997) model introduced rough inductive reason-
ing in the centipede game. They show that predictions under absentminded-
ness differ from predictions under perfect rationality and common knowledge.
As in the E-mail game, induction under a less perfect information technol-
ogy yielded new (payoff dominant) equilibria that were closer to intuition
and experimental observations.
Regarding the E-Mail Game, Dimitri (2000) solves the paradox by assum-
ing that the probabilities that a message gets lost are not the same for both
players and depend on who is sending the message. His approach is related
to the present one because it too changes the relative probability to be in a
certain component of a player’s information set, which breaks the inductive
argument of Rubinstein (1989).
A completely different solution to the E-Mail Game paradox is provided
by Binmore and Samuelson (2001). In an evolutionary model they explic-
itly specify costs for observing messages (their cost function is increasing in
the maximum number a player can recognize) and for sending messages. By
introducing this cost they show that a payoff dominant equilibrium is evo-
lutionarily stable where players choose action B if game Gb prevails and a
sufficient number of messages is sent. In one of my setups, the presumed
restriction on information can be seen as being due to costs. Compared to
their approach, in the present article it is possible that a player may not be
able to keep track of messages for some period of time, whereas later on (l
messages later) players might pay attention again. Binmore and Samuelson
(2001) also differ in that they do not allow for stochastic restrictions of capac-
ities. Schipper (2001) uses a “simplified model” (related to corollary 2 below)
where players for large numbers do not care exactly how many messages have
been sent and then studies evolutionary stability between two models players
may use to reason in this situation. He shows that both models - Rubinstein’s
and his simplified model - form evolutionarily stable strategy equilibria.
After introducing Rubinstein’s (1989) E-Mail game and presenting his
main result, the feasible information structures of the E-Mail Game are stud-
ied in Section three. The main result of this Section characterizes information
structures that result in Rubinstein’s paradox and those that lead to equi-
librium strategies that condition on the E-Mail communication. Section four
studies two alternative versions of the E-Mail game applying the result of Sec-
tion three. In these versions equilibrium predictions are close to predictions
under perfect information and rationality. Section five concludes.
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2 The E-Mail Game
In the Electronic Mail game two players either play a game Ga (with prob-
ability (1 − p) > 1
2
) or Gb (with probability p < 12). In each game players
choose between action A and B. In both games it is mutually beneficial for
players to choose the same action. Figure 1 describes the game. In game Ga
(Gb) the Pareto dominant equilibrium is the one where players coordinate
on A (B). If players choose different actions the player who played B is
punished by −L regardless of the game played. The other player gets 1. It is
assumed that the potential loss L is larger than or equal to the gain M and
both are positive.
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Figure 1: The structure of the E-mail Game (not a game tree!)
Only player one (she) is informed about the game that is actually played.
After the game is determined, two machines (one for each player) commu-
nicate which game is played. Only if game b prevails, player one´s machine
sends an E-mail message (a beep) to player two´s (he) machine which is
automatically confirmed. This confirmation is confirmed and so on. Let us
first assume that messages arrive with certainty.5 In this case, players have
5Assume the time needed for the T th message is equal to 1/2T . Under this assumption
5
common knowledge about which game is played and a payoff dominant equi-
librium exists, where players choose A in game Ga and B in Gb. Two other
equilibria exist which have equilibrium strategies that are constant in the
communication signals: always to play A and always to play B.
Rubinstein analyzes the situation when the E-Mail communication is al-
most perfect: With probability ε a message gets lost. Communication stops,
when one of the messages (the original message or one of the confirmations)
is lost. Players only know howmany messages their machine sent to the other
player. The number of messages sent is denoted by Ti, i ∈ {1, 2}. Once a
message is lost they have to make their decision. I assume that messages are
likely (ε small) to arrive:
ε <
M − 1
M + L
. (1)
The feasible states of the world will be represented by pairs (T1, T2) con-
sisting of the numbers of messages sent. I rule out that the machine of player
one fails to send a message although we are in game Gb. Therefore a pair is
sufficient, because game Gb must prevail if and only if at least one message
has been sent by player one´s machine (T1 ≥ 1).6 Player one always observes
when her machine sends a message and therefore always knows which game
is played. Note however that we do not rule out that this first message gets
lost.
The Electronic Mail game represents a slight deviation from common
knowledge (“almost common knowledge” in Rubinstein´s terminology). Com-
bined with perfect rationality this leads to a discontinuous drop in expected
payoffs. Paradoxically in this case the game has an equilibrium where players
never play the payoff dominant equilibrium in game b even if many messages
were sent whilst they play optimally whenever no message is sent (game Ga).
In that equilibrium communication is useless. Indeed, Rubinstein (1989)
proves that there is no Nash equilibrium where players condition on the num-
ber of messages sent. I follow the presentation of Osborne and Rubinstein
(1994):
an infinite number of messages can arrive in a finite amount of time which is equal to 2.
6I simplify the notation of Rubinstein (1989) who denotes the feasible states s of the
world by triples consisting of the game actually played and the number of messages
sent by the machines of player 1 and by player 2, i.e. s ∈ {(a, 0, 0); (b, 1, 0); (b, 1, 1);
(b, 2, 1); (b, 2, 2), ...(b, T1, T2)...}, T2 ∈ {T1 − 1;T1}.
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Proposition 1 The electronic mail game has a unique Nash equilibrium, in
which both players always choose A.
The formal proof is provided in Osborne and Rubinstein (1994). Because
the argument of the proof is helpful for the analysis below, I give a short
description. Figure 2 helps to understand the unductive proof which starts
with the fact that in states (0, 0) and (1, 0) the dominant strategy for player
1 is to play A. Thus in those states (A,A) is the only equilibrium given
p < 1
2
. The inductive hypothesis is that up to the informational outcome
where a player’s machine sent T − 1 messages it is optimal for him to play
A. From this hypothesis follows the inductive step that playing A is also
optimal for him when he observes that T messages have been sent by his
machine. This is because the consistent belief z = εε+ε(1−ε) =
1
2−ε to be at
the first of two indistinguishable outcomes (T, T − 1) and (T, T ) for player
one [or (T − 1, T − 1) and (T, T − 1) for player two] is greater than 1
2
. Given
that any player chooses A at the first of the two nodes in an information
set, it is the best reply to choose A because z > 1
2
and L ≥M which makes
the decision independent of the strategy of the other player at the second
indistinguishable outcome in the information set. By induction it follows
that this is true for every observed T .
I will now generalize the structure of the information sets and the resulting
beliefs of the E-Mail game and show under which conditions information
structures yield Rubinstein´s result.
3 Generalized Information Structures of the
E-Mail Game
Figure 2 gives a graphical representation of the communication process, where
the moves of the machines are represented. The states are the informational
“outcomes” of the moves by nature which are observed by the players before
they make their decisions.
In Rubinstein´s game, player one cannot distinguish states (T1, T1−1) and
(T1, T1) (and player two cannot distinguish states (T2, T2) and (T2 + 1, T2)).
In these cases, the player observes only that T1 (T2) messages have been
sent by her (his) machine. Player’s strategies can thus only condition on the
number of messages sent by her (his) machine. The same action is chosen in
7
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Figure 2: States and information sets in the E-mail Game (numbers are
the number of messages sent / information sets marked where either 1 or 2
messages sent by player’s machines)
two states of the world - for at least the two states where player i observes
that Ti messages were sent by his machine. In Figure 2 two information
sets for each player are marked. These are the sets where players observe
that either one or two messages have been sent. A player has to form beliefs
about which state in the information set is the actual one. These beliefs
are necessary to reach Rubinstein´s results. In Rubinstein´s game, each
information set intersects with two information sets of the other player.
To study a generalized version of possible information structures, denote
by Ii an information structure of player i. To distinguish the information
sets in Ii denote by I li element l in Ii. I define the following two relations to
be able to make ordinal statements over information sets. Definition 1 intro-
duces a lexicographic order over states and definition 2 applies this definition
to order information sets by comparing the smallest elements/states in two
information sets. In the following all statements are based on these relations.
Definition 1 Let <Lxbe a lexicographic order over pairs of natural numbers
such that (τ1, τ2) <Lx (ϑ1,ϑ2) :⇔ (τ1 < ϑ1) or (τ1 = ϑ1 and τ2 < ϑ2).
Definition 2 Let -Lxbe a lexicographic order over sets of pairs of natural
numbers such that I li -Lx Iki :⇔ min<Lx I li <Lx min<Lx Iki or min<Lx I li =
min<Lx I
k
i . Denote by ≺Lxthe strict relation.
8
Assume that each player´s feasible information is represented by a parti-
tion over all states of the world with the refinement that the information sets
consist only of consecutive states of the world.7 Without loss of generality I
number the information sets in Ii such that if l < k then I li -Lx Iki .
Rubinstein´s E-Mail Game is an example of information sets that fulfill
this condition. The information sets in his information structure contain two
consecutive states of the world. I allow for any information structure where a
player counts the messages in arbitrary units. A different story for this is that
players base the decision on the time elapsed in the communication process.
If the time needed to send a certain message follows a fixed function, then
the time used up before players are asked to make a decision is a signal which
is at least as informative as the number of messages sent. The information
sets above allow players to count the time in different and not necessarily
constant units.
To state the result, define the head of an information set as the elements
in this information set which contain the smallest element and are in the
intersection with one (and only one) information set of the other player. The
other elements in each information set are called the tail. More formally:
Definition 3 The head of an information set is defined as Head(Iki ) :=
{(τ1, τ2) ∈ min-Lx I lj s.t. Iki ∩I lj 6= ∅} and the tail as Tail(Iki ) := Iki \Head(Iki ).
To refer to Figure 2, (1,1) is the head of the first information set marked
for player two and (2,1) is the tail of this information set. Whereas the head
is never an empty set, the tail can be empty (if the information set of the
other player contains fully the information set of this player) or can contain
several information sets of the other player.8
For presentational purpose I describe the following from the perspective
of player one (she). It holds vice versa for player two (he). A strategy maps
the informations sets into the set of feasible actions {A,B}. Equilibrium
7To be formally precise, the information sets in the partition must be order intervals
in <Lx.
8To given an example, assume player one recognizes only odd numbers, whereas
player two only counts every fourth number, e.g. 1, 5, 9 etc.. Both recognize
if at least one message has been sent. Thus player one’s partition of the state
space is {{(0, 0)}, {(1, 0), (1, 1), (2, 1), (2, 2)}, {(3, 2), (3, 3), (4, 3), (4, 4)}, ...}. Whereas
the same set of player two is {{(0, 0), (1, 0)}, {(1, 1), (2, 1), (2, 2), (3, 2), (3, 3), (4, 3),
(4, 4), (5, 4)}, {(5, 5), (6, 5), ...}. The head of the second information set of player two con-
tains the elements (1, 1), (2, 1) and (2, 2).
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strategies of player one are best replies given the strategy of player two. In
equilibrium she chooses for each information set the action that is optimal
given the actions he chooses in the intersecting information sets (one or more
than one). In particular, it is of importance whether actions chosen by the
other player differ in the head and the tail of an information set.
Next, I introduce a notion of a monotone strategy. A strategy that makes
use of communication in the E-Mail Game should be monotone in the number
of messages sent. Intuitively, communication reduces the uncertainty whether
the other player chooses B instead of A based on his or her knowledge. If
this uncertainty is small enough, a player chooses to play B instead of A and
only one such switch from A to B can occur because more communication,
i.e. messages sent, reduces the uncertainty even further. Formally, I name a
strategymonotone if there exists a k such that for all I li with I
l
i -Lx Iki action
A is chosen whereas otherwise B is chosen.9 That is, monotone strategies
change only once from choosing A to B over the number of messages sent,
thus if more than a fixed number of messages is sent then action B will be
played, whereas whenever less than this number of messages is sent then A
is chosen.
If at least one information set contains not too many elements in the head
compared to the number of elements in the tail, then there exists a payoff
dominant Nash-equilibrium in which players’ equilibrium (monotone) strate-
gies condition on the number of messages sent. The number is determined
by the payoffs. For M = L it suffices that the head contains strictly less
elements than the tail. Let n(I li) =
¯¯
I li
¯¯
be the number of elements in an
information set I li and n
h(I li) =
¯¯
Head(I li)
¯¯
the number of elements in the
head of the information set. Denote by I∗i - the first information set where
one player, namely player i in equilibrium plays B instead of A.
Proposition 2 There exists a continuous function f : <4 → < such that if,
for at least one information set I li of one player, n
h(I li) < f(M,L, ε, n(I
l
i)),
then a monotone strategy profile forming a payoff dominant equilibrium exist.
In addition as ε→ 0 the existence condition reduces to n
h(Ili)
n(Ili)
< M−1
L+M−1 .
Proof. Let player i be the player who has the smallest (-Lx) information set
(of both players) which fulfills the condition of the proposition and denote
9I do not consider the case where a player switches once from B to A because this is
dominated by playing always B.
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this information set by I∗i . Denote by I
∗
j the information set of player j that
is associated with the head of I∗i . I prove by construction that an equilibrium
exists where players strategies are monotone and player i plays B from I∗i
onwards and player j plays B from the information set following I∗j .
Lets us first consider the strategies for the information sets I li ÂLx I∗i
and Ikj ÂLx I∗j . For these information sets the other player chooses B in the
head and the tail of each information set. Hence both playing B forms an
equilibrium. Let us now consider I∗i .
Denote by ez the belief that player i assigns to being in the head of I∗i
whenever the state of the world is in I∗i . This belief is given as
ez = Pnhi=1 ε(1− ε)i−1Pn
i=1 ε(1− ε)i−1
=
1− (1− ε)nh(Ili)
1− (1− ε)n(Ili)
. (2)
For a best reply of player i in I∗i to play B given player j follows the
proposed strategy, the following must hold:
ez(−L) + (1− ez)(M) > (1− ez)1. (3)
For given M,L, ε, n(I li) this determines a critical size f(M,L, ε, n(I
l
i)) of the
head of an information set. Whenever the actual size nh(I li) is larger than
f(M,L, ε, n(I li)) then the optimal reply condition holds and at least for one
information set the condition must be fulfilled. For ε → 0 the condition
reduces to n
h(Ili)
n(Ili)
< M−1
M−1+L .
Player 1 plays A in her first information set given p < 1
2
. Given the
definition of I∗i , it is the smallest information set of both players where the
condition (3) holds for one player, thus for Ikj - I∗j and any all I li ≺ I∗i it is
optimal for player j to play A independent of the action player i in the tail
of the information set under consideration because player one always plays A
in her first information set. So even optimistic beliefs (that the other player
chooses B in the tail of an information set) do not support playing B. I∗i is
the smallest information set that can break the induction and allows for an
equilibrium with “optimistic” beliefs.
To phrase the result in a different way, the proposition says if at least one
information set of one of the players has a head that contains less elements
than its tail then payoffs M ≤ L exist which support a payoff dominant
equilibrium with strategies that condition on the E-Mail communication.
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4 Rough Induction in the E-Mail Game
The previous section characterized necessary conditions on the cardinalities
of the Head and the Tail of the information sets of players such that a
monotone payoff dominant equilibrium exists. In this section, I apply this
result to specific versions of the E-Mail game. These (plausible) versions
affect the relative size of heads and tails of information sets.
4.1 Counting in different units
To highlight a special feature of Rubinstein’s result, I characterize in this
section the information structures needed to get Rubinstein’s result regard-
ing the potential information structures. Consider a situation where players
(i = 1, 2) machines only count every uith message sent (they count in units
of size 2ui states of the world), e.g. they only count even numbers. Ru-
binstein´s standard setup is the case u1 = u2 = 1. In this subsection the
situation where players count in different units is analyzed. The idea is sim-
ilar to Morris (2001) who studies a “timing” version of the E-Mail game. In
the present case, one can interpret ‘counting in different units’ as having as
information about a discrete amount of time spent on communication where
time is rounded upwards or downwards.
Suppose both players have ni > 1. That is each agents information sets
contain at least two states of the world. Whenever this is the case, the
relative size of head compared to the tail can only for specific assumptions
fulfill the condition that no payoff dominant equilibrium exists. I record the
result as a corollary of proposition 2.
Corollary 1 If both players have the same odd u1 = u2 = u and player two
(one) starts counting (u−1)/2 ((u+1)/2) received messages later than player
one (two) then Rubinstein’s result applies and no equilibrium exists where
players condition on the E-Mail communication. In all other cases (u1 6= u2,
u even or the information sets do not intersect in the prescribed way) then if
L−M not too large a payoff dominant equilibrium exists where both players
condition on the E-Mail communication. In this equilibrium players choose B
if the prevailing state of the world is for both players contained in the second
information set.
In Rubinstein’s game the information sets of both players intersect with
information sets of the other player. In the case that n1 = n2 each infor-
12
mation set intersects with two information sets of the other player. For the
case n1 = n2 = 1 these intersections contain one element only (see Figure
2). Thus head and tail of each information set contain an equal number of
states of the world. The condition of proposition 2 is fulfilled for sure if the
state of the world is contained at least in the second information set.
4.2 Non-distinguishability
One direct way to illustrate proposition 2 is to assume that for one player
one information set is enlarged. That is (at least) one player is for some
t ∈ {T, T +1, ..., T + l} not able to observe (or to process) the exact number
of messages sent. We record this as a second corollary.
Corollary 2 If exactly one player cannot distinguish the numbers of mes-
sages sent if t ∈ {T, T+1, ..., T+l} then ∃ l∗ > 0 such that a payoff dominant
equilibrium exists where players condition their strategies on the communica-
tion process if T > 0 and l > l∗. In equilibrium both players play B if their
machine sent t ≥ T and A in all other cases.
The result of proposition 2 applies because in this case the head of one
information set contains only one element whereas the tail contains at least
three. Rubinstein (1989) already discussed the special case when there is a
maximum number of messages send. Justifications for this assumption could
be the “overflow” of the machine´s capacities or that real players actually
stop counting after they sent a certain number of messages. This corresponds
to l =∞. The previous corollary assumed that there is no maximum number
T . It allows for the possibility that the machine of a player malfunctions
for some periods but show the correct number of messages sent later again
(l <∞).10
10In contrast to one referee I do like an interpretation of bounded rationality for this
case: In this interpretations, where a player is not able process large numbers correctly,
the l → ∞ assumption seems unrealistic. People are known to mess up especially large
numbers but in the case numbers differ substantially people do recognize the relation,
and whenever prominent numbers are reached, people pay attention again. To give an
example 1389 and 1394 may be put in the wrong order whenever the decision maker is
under stress. This effect is not present when the numbers in question are 1389 and 10394.
Tversky(1969, 1977) emphasizes the role of similarities on human reasoning. Theoretical
contributions are Rubinstein (1988) and Albers and Albers (1988).
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The assumption of T > 0 necessitates a remark regarding the case of T =
0. It points out the importance of knowing the underlying communication
process.
Remark 1 If players become only aware of the E-Mail communication if a
sufficient number of messages has been sent then it matters whether a player
knows the underlying fact (that game b is played).
This remark is driven by the fact that corollary 2 holds for a given l > l∗,
only if 0 is not among the set of indistinguishable numbers (T > 0). With
respect to proposition 2, the argument there cannot be applied to break the
“pessimistic” induction because whenever for the first information set of both
players it is always optimal to play A given p < 1
2
. If there is no other set of
non-distinguishable numbers, then the only equilibrium where players play
A whenever no message is sent is one where players always choose A.
The direct assumption that there exists one information set that supports
a payoff dominant equilibrium opens up the question what prediction can be
made when no T is given but, that there is an in t increasing probability
that either machine does not provide correct information in case t, t+1, ... or
t+ l messages were sent. This can be a model For simplicity of presentation
I assume that l is exogenously determined. This implies the belief to be in
the head of an information set is given as ez = εP2l+1
i=0 ε(1−ε)i
= ε
1−(1−ε)2l+2 .
Let η(t) be the probability that {t; t+1; ...; t+ l} is a non-distinguishable
set of numbers for player one. It is defined to strictly increase in t. If non-
distinguishability affects the utilizable information when t messages have
been sent by player one´s machine, it will not do so for the following (non-
distinguishable) l numbers of messages sent.11 In the appendix I will define
random variables and their distribution to define the process more formally.12
η(t) is common knowledge among players. We find the following result:
Proposition 3 If 1−ezez (M − 1) > L and η(t) is monotone increasing then
there exists a critical number T ∗ of messages sent, such that in a payoff
11This implies that if the player cannot distinguish {16, 17, .., 20} then
{17, 18, .., 21}...{20, 21, .., 24} cannot be sets of non-distinguishable numbers for this
player. The next set of numbers among which player one with probability η(21) cannot
distinguish is {21, 22, .., 25} .
12I assume a certain form of independence. The result holds too without indepency, in
this case one needs to apply Sylvester’s Lemma (see for example Theorem 19, p. 24 in
Mood, Graybill and Boes (1974)) to prove Proposition 3.
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dominant equilibrium players coordinate on action B if more than this critical
number of messages have been sent by their machines.
The proof is provided in the appendix.
This result generalizes the intuition of 2. Even the possibility that there
exists an information set where the relative size of head and tail changes is
sufficient to induce coordination at some endogeneousely determined T ∗.
4.3 Expected payoffs and rough induction
Let me finally state an interesting aspect about the effect of the size of the
information sets on the expected payoffs in the resulting equilibria:
Remark 2 Rubinstein´s “almost common knowledge” leads to a discontin-
uous drop with regard to ε in the expected payoff. With the considered cases
of rough inductive reasoning the change in the expected payoff is continuous.
Consider the expected payoffs of the Electronic Mail Game under the var-
ious assumptions on player information. If it is common knowledge (ε = 0)
which game is played, the expected payoff of the payoff dominant equilib-
rium is Πe = M . When there is a probability ε that a message gets lost
(Rubinstein´s (1989) article), the expected payoff of the payoff dominant
equilibrium drops to Πe = pM , because only in game a players choose the
mutually beneficial actions. If the messages may get lost but one of the
players (potentially) suffers from non-distinguishability, the expected payoff
drop changes continuously in ε. For small ε it is almost the same as under
common knowledge, i.e. limε→∞Πe =M . Restricting the information to the
case where only player one knows about the state of the world, i.e. where
player two suffers from non-distinguishability with T = 0 and l = ∞, the
expected payoff is the same as in Rubinstein´s game.
5 Conclusions
I introduced a model of rough inductive reasoning and applied it to Rubin-
stein’s (1989) Electronic Mail game. Rubinstein (1989) showed that “almost
common knowledge” leads to different optimal behavior compared to the op-
timal behavior under common knowledge. This paradoxical result has led to
a discussion about good definitions of common knowledge in such situation,
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Morris (2001+2002) and others advocate approximate common knowledge as
an appropriate path to follow. My approach differed. I generalized and stud-
ied the underlying information structures that yield the results and provide
a notion of rough inductive reasoning that solves the paradox.
In this article the assumed examples for rough inductive reasoning - non-
distinguishability and counting in different units - lead to the existence of
an additional equilibrium in the respective game which is payoff dominant
and uses communication. In the respective equilibrium the expected payoffs
change continuously in the chance of communication error ε. Given a change
in the optimal strategy at one stage, induction leads to an additional pay-
off dominant equilibrium if a sufficient number of messages has been sent.
Actions chosen by players differ in Rubinstein’s original setting and the sec-
ond variation presented above - even if players precisely observe the same
number of messages has been sent by their machine. Suppose a player in
Rubinstein´s original game and a player in the extended game (one player
suffers with positive probability from non-distinguishability) observe each
that exactly τ messages have been sent by their machine. If τ is greater
than a critical number of messages sent then best-reply-strategies differ. An
informational deficiency which potentially affects the utilizable information
at another (smaller / “earlier”) informational “outcome” breaks the induc-
tion. A local deficiency in information technology (or in processing ability)
changes the optimal strategy even though at the decision making point in
time the utilizable information is the same as in the case where no local defi-
ciency exists. It is therefore not necessary - as it was in Rubinstein’s solution
- that bounded rationality affects the decision maker when he has to make
his decision.
6 Appendix - Proof of Proposition 3
The following strategies form the equilibrium in question: Let T ∗ be the
number where both and especially player two chooses B if he observes t ≥ T ∗
and A otherwise. Player one plays B whenever she observes a t > T ∗.
If she suffers from non-distinguishability in a way that T ∗ is in the non-
distinguishable set of numbers player one plays B given that the smallest
number of messages sent contained in her affected information set is not
smaller than T ∗−k∗. In all other cases she plays A. In the appendix I prove
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that this is an equilibrium given the stated restrictions on l,M and L. T ∗
and k∗ are also characterized in the appendix. Player one´s strategy relative
to player 2’s strategy is determined by k∗ and depends only on ε given player
two plays B if a fixed number of messages is sent. It is independent of player
two´s strategy which is characterized by T ∗. T ∗ is determined by k∗ and
η(t).
We assume that l is large enough, i.e. the following holds:
1− ezez (M − 1) = (M − 1)
2l+1X
i=1
(1− ε)i > L . (4)
To prove the proposition, I start by proving a lemma that captures the case
of a sufficiently large probability η to suffer from non-distinguishability at
the states of the world where a player observes t ∈ {T, T + 1, ..., T + l}. For
the ease of presentation, I state the argument for the case where player one
may suffer from non-distinguishability.
Lemma 1 Suppose player one suffers with probability η from non-distinguishability
such that he cannot distinguish among the t ∈ {T, T+1, ..., T+l}. If 1−ezez (M−
1) > L and (1 − η) ≤ (2−ε)(M−1)
M+L−1 then there exists a payoff dominant Nash
equilibrium where both players play B whenever t ≥ T+1 messages have been
sent by their machines. For M = L large, η < ε suffices for the existence of
such an equilibrium.
The following strategies are the equilibrium in question: If player one
suffers from non-distinguishability she chooses B if she observes a t ≥ T
and A otherwise. If player one does not suffer from non-distinguishability,
she chooses B whenever she observes a t > T and A otherwise. Player two
chooses B if he observes a t ≥ T and A otherwise. I will prove that this is
an equilibrium given the stated restrictions on M , L and η.
Proof of Lemma 1. I show that the strategies are best reply strategies.
Up to ”outcome” (T − 1, T − 1) the equilibrium strategies are proved by the
inductive argument of Rubinstein (proposition 1).
Given that player two’s strategy is the same as the strategy of player two
in corollary 2, the corollary ensures that the described behavior of player one
is a best reply whenever she suffers from non-distinguishability (and l is large
enough). If player one does not suffer from non-distinguishability her best
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reply is to play A whenever she observes t ≤ T messages have been sent by
her machine (see proposition 1). If she observes a t > T then given the stated
strategy of player two her best reply is to play B because player two plays
B at both of the states in her information set. Therefore given the strategy
of player two player one´s strategies are best replies.
Given the strategy of player one, player two plays B whenever he observes
that exactly T messages have been sent if his expected payoff is greater than
the payoff from playing A, i.e.
ηM + (1− η)(z(−L) + (1− z)M) ≥ η + (1− η)(1− z) (5)
where z = εε+ε(1−ε) =
1
2−ε is the consistent belief of the player not suffering
from non-distinguishability that the state is (T, T ) instead of (T + 1, T ).
Player two´s payoff is 0 if he chooses A. Therefore B is a best reply if (5)
holds. This is equivalent to (1− η) ≤ (2−ε)(M−1)
M+L−1 as stated in the proposition.
Given the observation of any t > T by player two his best reply is to
choose B because player one chooses B at both states of the world in the
information set in question.
For M = L the condition (1− η) ≤ (2−ε)(M−1)
M+L−1 simplifies to η ≥
ε(M−1)+1
2M−1 ,
where ε(M−1)+1
2M−1 < ε⇔M >
1
2ε . (Lemma)
If this holds and the probability to suffer from non-distinguishability is
large compared to the probability that a message gets lost a Nash equilibrium
exists where players condition on the number of messages sent.
Inequality (4) is the condition such that the player suffering from non-
distinguishability behaves as predicted by the equilibrium beliefs of the other
player. It determines a critical bl such that for given M,L, ε and l > bl the
equilibrium strategy of the player suffering from non-distinguishability is a
best reply strategy. Whereas the other players strategy is best reply if condi-
tion (5) holds. The latter condition determines a critical level of η for given
M,L, εM. Hence, analyzing optimal behavior of the players one needs to look
for one player only at the critical level for l and for the other player only at
the critical level for η. This form of independence is important for the proof
of the proposition.
As an instrument of presentation I define a series of independently dis-
tributed random variables Xt ∈ {0; 1}, where P (Xt = 1) := η(t) is the
probability that Xt = 1. A player cannot distinguish among a set of numbers
{t, t+ 1, ..., t+ l} if and only if Xt = 1 and Xτ = 0 ∀τ ∈ {t− l, ..., t− 1} (in
words: t is itself not an element of a set on non-distinguishable numbers).
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Given this definition how η(t) affects the information structure player one I
prove the result.
First I analyze the behavior of the from non-distinguishability suffering
player one. Assume that player two plays B if and only if he observes a
t2 ≥ T. Let
k∗ = max
k
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
k
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯ P2ki=0 ε(1− ε)iP2l+1
i=0 ε(1− ε)i
(−L)| {z }+
P2l+1
i=2k+1 ε(1− ε)iP2l+1
i=0 ε(1− ε)i
(M − 1) ≥ 0| {z }
⎫
⎪⎬
⎪⎭
expected loss (t < t2) expected gain (t ≥ t2)
k∗ is described as follows. The left hand side of the inequality is the
expected payoff increase if the player chooses B instead of A given he knows
that the number of messages sent is in the set of non-distinguishable numbers
and the smallest element in this set is equal to T − k (XT−k = 1). T −
k∗ is the smallest number of messages sent so that player one gets a non-
negative expected payoff given player two plays B whenever he observes
that more than T messages have been sent by his machine. If the smallest
number in a non-distinguishable set is smaller than T −k∗ then the expected
payoff is negative. Note that k∗ depends only on l for a given M,L, ε and is
independent of η(t) and therefore independent of T .
Next consider the behavior of player two. We know from above that if
player one does not suffer from non-distinguishability he will play A if he
observes a t1 ≤ T . Denote by eη(T ) the probability that player one plays B
because he suffers from non-distinguishability whenever exactly T messages
have been sent by player two´s machine,
eη(T ) = 1−ΠTi=T−k∗ (1− η(i)).
Define T ∗ = min τ {τ
¯¯¯
(1− eη(τ)) ≤ (2−ε)(M−1)
M+L−1
o
as the critical number of
messages sent. T ∗ is the number of messages send such that player two´s
expected payoff from playing B is positive.
To prove best reply characteristics of the strategies I show first that given
player two´s strategy, player one´s strategy is a best reply. Given the uti-
lizable information is not affected , optimality follows from the fact that for
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t > T ∗ player two plays B for all states of the world which are element of
the information set. If the utilizable information is affected and T ∗ is among
the non-distinguishable numbers, by definition of k∗ B is optimal to choose
for this information set if the smallest element in the non-distinguishable set
is larger than T ∗ − k∗.
Next I prove that player two´s strategy is a best reply. If (1− eη(T ∗)) ≤
(2−ε)(M−1)
M+L−1 player two´s expected payoff from playing B is positive if he ob-
serves that exactly T ∗ messages have been sent by his machine. The idea is
the same as in the proof of lemma 1 equation (5).
This completes the proof of best reply of player one given player two plays
as described. Note T ∗ is defined as the smallest number of messages such
that the expected payoff is positive. Therefore player two will never play B
when he observes a t < T ∗.
The existence of T ∗ is guaranteed by the condition on η(t) and the obvious
fact that eη(t) increases in t.
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